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Introduction
This paper focuses on COSATU workers' perceptions of trade
union and parliamentary democracy in a survey conducted,
during the month preceding the election. It provides insight
into their understanding and practice of a participatory
democratic tradition that was established by some COSATU
unions in the 1970s. It furthermore shows that workers have
transferred their understanding of trade union democracy
directly to their expectations of parliamentary democracy.
This has important implications for the relationship between
COSATU and the new government.
But what is trade union democracy and how did the workers
arrive at their understanding of union democracy? In order
to provide a framework for answering these questions the
paper commences with an exposition of the historical
development of trade union democracy in the country that
first gave birth to trade unionism, Great Britain. The
reasons why the British experience is chosen are, firstly,
because many of the unions in COSATU modelled their
democracy on that existent in Britain at the time of their
emergence in the early 1970s; secondly, the exposition helps
to clarify concepts that are central to this paper namely
direct democracy, oligarchy, participative democracy and
shopfloor or workplace democracy.
I wish to acknowledge the contribution of Geoff Wood to
this paper. Part 3 is based on work he has done in the
joint research project from which this paper emanates.
1. A Democratic Tradition
1.1 Historical Development of Trade Union Democracy
Sidney and Beatrice Webb examined the development of trade
union democracy in British trade unions from their origins
up to the early twentieth century. They did so in their
book, Industrial Democracy, which was published in 1897.
They called the first stage of trade union democracy to
emerge xprimitive democracy'. It took place in the local
trade clubs of the eighteenth century and was a form of
direct participatory democracy. The members strove to
conduct all the business at the general meetings and were
imbued with the principle of 'what concerns all should be
decided by all' (Webb, 1911:8). The president was often only
chosen for a particular meeting and the next most important
officers were usually chosen by rotation. The early xtrade
clubs' were thus organisations in which all members
participated without an established hierarchy of officials.
However, when the local unions started federating into
national unions between 1824 and 1840 it was no longer
possible for the unions to practice direct democracy. On
account of their regional dispersion it became necessary for
the national unions to elect full-time secretaries. The
unions however still tried to continue vesting supreme
authority in the members by means of a referndum which
granted any section of the union the right ^to insist on its
proposals being submitted to the vote of the whole
electprate'. (Webb, 1911:21)
The referendum however had the opposite effect of what was
intended: instead of the members retaining a real say in the
affairs of the union, control was centralised and enabled
the development of oligarchic rule by the officials and
executive. This happened because
the right of putting questions to the vote came
practically to be confined to the executive... Any
change which the executive desired could be stated in
the most plausible terms and supported by convincing
arguements, which almost invariably secured its
adoption by a large majority... (Webb,1911:26)
Towards the last decade of the nineteenth century,
after about a century of organisational experience,
oligarchy, that is, domination by a few officials, was
prevalent in the British trade union movement. This, the
Webbs maintained, was because of the attempt to retain
direct participatory democracy in national organisations
(Webb, 1911:36).
The more advanced trade unions had however become aware of
the existence and causes of oligarchy. Their constitutions
underwent a ^silent revolution' after 1889 to emerge with a
representative form of democracy, in the opinion of the
Webbs this was successful in solving
the fundamental problem of democracy, the combination
of administrative efficiency and popular control (Webb,
1911:38).
The central feature of the system of representative
democracy was the election of an assembly of representatives
as the supreme body in the union. It also appointed an
executive committee which governed the union between
conferences of the assemblies (Webb, 1911:38-9,43-4).
In order to obtain a balance between workers' aspirations
and efficient administration, the unions made provision for
representation of both workers and officials on their
assemblies and executive committees. The executive committee
of one of the unions, the Cotton Operatives, for instance,
consisted of three office bearers as well as thirteen
additional members, seven of whom had to be working spinners
while the remaining six were permanent officials (Webb,
1911:39). This had the effect of restoring some popular
control in the unions. Although the officials still tended
to dominate at the assembly conferences the worker
representatives frequently intervened 'with effect' in the
procedures (Webb,. 1911:44).
This form of worker participation however only took place at
the level of the supreme representative assembly, not the
shopfloor. It not only limited the potential for trade union
democracy through rank and file participation, but also
opened the way for oligarchic tendencies to re-assert
themselves in the unions.
The way these oligarchic tendencies were overcome in British
trade unions was through the emergence of a strong shop
stewards movement. Shop stewards initially had the task of
protecting their craft from job dilution, but their role was
widened to workplace negotiation at the end of the
nineteenth century (Clegg, 1979:21).
After briefly emerging during the First World War, shop
stewards came to the fore in industrial relations in Britain
in the 1960s as they shifted the emphasis of negotiation to
workplace bargaining. The drive was provided by the rise in
rank-and-file strength and militancy (Lane, 1974:162). In
the upsurge of workplace bargaining the shop stewards' role
was no longer one of protecting a craft, but negotiating
directly with management on the shopfloor over wages and a
wide range of working conditions. This included health and
safety, dismissal and other disciplinary actions, as well as
negotiating about the introduction of new machinery and jobs
(Clegg, 1979:24).
The upsurge in autonomous workplace bargaining under the
leadership of shop stewards made its impact felt on trade
union organisation as well. The most significant change was
the incorporation of shop stewards into the union
structures- By impelling themselves onto the various bodies
of the unions, shop stewards did much to restore democratic
practices in the unions once again. Decision-making in the
unions shifted towards the shopfloor as pressure could be
brought to bear from the shop stewards who had autonomous
power bases in the workplace (Clegg, 1979:220).
Although much more could be added about the historical and
contemporary struggle to establish and maintain democracy in
trade unions, enough has been said to provide some
conclusions based on the British experience. (1) The first
is that efforts to maintain direct participatory democracy
on the part of large national unions resulted in oligarchy.
The second is that the introduction of representative
democracy in the unions' assemblies and executives did a
great deal to restore democracy to the unions. The third is
that the emergence of a strong shop stewards movement in the
1960s introduced participatory shopfloor democracy to the
unions.
1.2 Origins of Participatory Democracy in COSATU
The origins of participatory democracy in COSATU can be
traced to the unions that emerged in South Africa at the
time of the Durban strikes in 1973. Almost from the outset
these unions were committed to the creation of participatory
shopfloor democracy in their structures and as part of their
practice.
The independent unions emerging in the 1970s that
concentrated on participatory workplace organisation were
the Natal and Transvaal unions belonging to the Trade Union
Advisory and Co-ordinating Council (TUACC) and the Western
Province General Workers' Union in Cape Town (subseguently
it became the General Workers' Union, GWU). The TUACC unions
merged with other independent unions in 1979 to form the
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). In 1985
FOSATU, the GWU, and many other unions committed to non-
racialism, founded the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU).
A key influence in these unions were intellectuals based at
the liberal universities of Natal, Witwatersrand and cape
Town. They were moved by the upsurge of the shop steward
movement in the British trade union movement in the 1960s as
well as the strong surge for participatory democracy that
1. See Maree, 1986:33-53, for more details.
followed in the wake of the 1968 student and workers'
revolts in France and other European countries.
The workers, for their part, threw themselves with zest into
the task of building factory committees consisting of worker
representatives. In due time these committees became shop
steward committees comprising elected shop stewards. (2) In
practice the strategy of workplace organisation was
implemented in different ways by distinct union groupings.
The TUACC unions in Natal commenced with mass recruitment as
workers poured into the unions after the Durban strikes.
When the weakness of this organisational strategy dawned on
the organisers during 1974 to 1975 the unions switched to
in-depth workplace organisation. Shop stewards were "given
the key tasks of recruiting and organising workers,
collecting subscriptions, canvassing worker positions on
issues and taking them up with management. To do so, they
had to meet regularly, usually weekly, as committees where
they also received training.
By contrast the MAWU branch of TUACC in Johannesburg engaged
in intensive workplace organisation right from the outset.
At Heinemann Electric, the union's best organised factory, •
as many as three weekly meetings were being held during the
intensive struggle for recognition by the union. The
tradition continued after the union lost the Heinemann
dispute: shop stewards' meetings of all the factories being
organised were held weekly and more frequently when there
was a dispute taking place.
The WPGWU also laid an emphasis on workplace organisation
although they organised works committees rather than shop
stewards committees. In effect there was no difference as
the works committees consisted of elected worker
representatives. From the outset regular weekly meetings
were held with works committees from organised plants. In
addition monthly general meetings with the rank and file
members from each enterprise were also held, it gradually
developed a principle that only worker representatives and
not officials should negotiate with management. This was in
order to ensure the representativeness and accountability of
the negotiators.
The above detailed account shows that the foundations of
workplace participatory democracy were, firmly laid in
independent unions that emerged during the 1970s and
subsequently became affiliates in COSATU. It was however not
only participatory democracy, but also representative
democracy that developed in the unions over this period.
Already in the late 1970s they were struggling to ensure
that the democracy was truly representative. To illustrate
2. For a union by union account of how this was achieved
in the 1970s, see Maree, 1986.
how the unions tried to ensure the representativeness of
their democratic structures, an example from TUACC in Natal
is presented.
1.3 Striving to Implement Representative Democracy in TUACC
The commitment of the intellectuals in the movement to
democracy led them to construct TUACC in such a manner that
workers' control was formally built into the organisation.
TUACC consisted of a Council and Secretariat: the Council
was'composed of the full Branch Executive Committees (BECs)
of the unions affiliated- to it. The Secretariat consisted of
two representatives nominated by each affiliated union, only
one of which could be a paid official of the union.
Furthermore, only trade union representatives had voting
rights on the Council and Secretariat.(3) The principle of
worker representative majorities was thus built into both
the TUACC Council and Secretariat.
Even though a democratic structure with worker majorities
had been created, a basic problem was to ensure the
representativeness of the union representatives on TUACC.
Already at the first meeting of the TUACC Secretariat in
June 1975 concern was expressed about the danger that
members of the Secretariat may not represent the interests
of their constituents at the meetings. They were therefore
encouraged to report back to their BECs and union or local
staff meetings. Furthermore they were also reminded that:
since they did not come as individuals they were only
entitled to put forward the arguments of their union,
not their-own point of view.(4)
This however turned out to be a vain hope. Four years later
in 1979 the regional secretary again noted that:
the functioning of the Secretariat remains a matter of
concern. There is a need for all members of the
Secretariat to improve the extent to which they express
the position of those they represent rather than simply
their own viewpoint.(5)
By that stage one of the unions, the Metal and Allied
Workers' Union (HAWU), had taken steps to overcome the
problem. The MAWU BEC submitted specific resolutions to the
Secretariat rather than leaving it up to the MAWU
representatives to put forward the union's position. It is
3. TUACC Constitution, Clauses 5 and 6.
4. Minutes, TUACC Secretariat meeting, 23 June 1975.
5. J.Mawbey, Secretary's Report to the Natal Regional
Council, 2 March 1979.
thus clear that the form of democracy being establishes in
the unions was both participatory and representative.
1.4 Democratic Ethic in Unions
In trying to answer the question where COSATU workers
surveyed in 1994 acquired their understanding of trade -union
democracy, the above exposition has made it clear that the
foundations of their understanding were laid during ttte
1970s. But it was not only a set of democratic practices and
structures that were entrenched, a democratic ethic was also
implanted in the union members during the 1970s. What -The
unions were trying to achieve in the 1970s and what lay
behind the thinking of the intellectuals was well expressed
by Alec Erwin in 1979.. He became secretary of TUACC in 1977
and, subsequently, the first general secretary of FOSATU.
It seems to me there are, broadly speaking, two
conceptions of democracy. One I would style a radical-
liberal conception which is that everyone must have his
say and be allowed to vote. And within those people
someone must be a leader. I think that kind-of
democracy is actually open to disguised power
manipulation and control because every man speaking
will not change basic structures or institution's in
society. We'd say you must have resilient structures
that can hold people accountable in a real sense.
So the alternate conception of democracy is a much more
structured view: that people must be able to control
what is possible to control. We must establish more
definite structures of accountability. So what we were
trying to build in TUACC, and are presently trying to
achieve in FOSATU, is that the democratic structure
must be through a process of the factory controlling
the shop steward because that man the worker sees every
day in the plant, his access to him is far greater.
Then the shop steward sits on the BEC and the report
back system is structured and definite. If I could
contrast this, say, to a BEC that's elected at an AGM.
There is no clear structure of systematic
accountability there. So we've been trying in TUACC to
build that structure up from shop steward to BEC to
TUACC.
Now that is a very much slower process because
structures in themselves never create democracy. Only
aware leadership and membership create democracy. So
once having built shop stewards you then have to make
them effective shop stewards. If they are effective
their membership is going to be more informed,
conscious and interested in knowing what they are
doing. And likewise good shop stewards will make a good
BEC, and a good BEC a good National Executive.
Committee.(6)
Erwin's evaluation of the extent to which intellectuals in
TUACC had succeeded in creating democratic trade unions by
1979 flowed from the form of democracy they were pursuing.
Now it does mean that the conceivers of democratic
structures, the intellectual leadership, will be more
dominant in the initial period. While there is no doubt
that a few of us have been very important and dominant
and we pushed and buldozed to some extent, I think that
the practices and lines we've established are
democratic and resilient. I think we built up fcEC
executives and shop stewards who can decide for
themselves, who are effective in their own plants. The
more successful they are the more that leadership will
become powerful and effective. Now working on that
conception of democracy it will take more time.
I would say in TUACC whilst we [the intellectuals -JM]
might be powerful there's no possibility that we could
massively abuse the power structures. It's just because
certain ethics have been established which cannot be
broken at this point no matter how dominant the
intellectual might be. We have more resilient checks
against our power than whatever had been achieved by
the liberal-democratic conception of democracy. I don't
deny that we might have a lot of power and influence,
but equally it's nonsense to say that workers must just
democratically rise up.
To my mind the one thing that the TUACC experience did
create is its conception that workers' control as an
ethic is crucial and that the BEC is more important
than the organiser. I do believe we've got that. We
haven't as yet got a capacity for the BEC to
effectively dominate the organiser, but the ethic that
it should do is firmly implanted and not challengeable.
So I think an organiser can't step too far outside
that. If he does he's gone.(7)
The account thus far has outlined the historical development
of trade union democracy in Britain and the way in which it
was practiced in South Africa by the independent unions that
emerged during the 1970s and subsequently became affiliates
of COSATU. In the next section the rapid growth during the
1980s of the independent unions, particularly COSATU, is
presented. The organisational consequences for'COSATU of
this rapid growth are then examined.
6. Interview: Erwin, 1979.
7. Ibid.
2. Union Growth in 1980s and its Consequences
2.1 Rapid Growth in the 1980s
After the state 'legitimised' African trade unions in 1979
by granting them official recognition, the independent
unions grew explosively in the 1980s. The trend continued
albeit at a decelerating rate into the 1990s. Total trade
union membership from 1979 to 1991 increased almost fourfold
from 700 000 to 2,7 million with trade union density (the
proportion of the labour force unionised) in the non-
agricultural sector rising from 15% to 53% (Macun, 1993:49).
More specifically, the membership of the independent (mainly
African) unions shot up in the first four years after 1979
from 70 000 to 300 000. It was particularly with regard to
formal recognition that the unions made most headway.
Whereas there were only 5 recognition agreements at the end
of 1979 there were no less than 406 by the end of 1983.
FOSATU accounted for 70% of the agreements (Maree,
1985:297).
COSATU also made very rapid headway: at the time of its
formation in November 1985 it had 462 000 members. By the
end of 1991 its membership had increased almost threefold to
1,26 million. Three quarters of its membership in 1991 were
concentrated in the manufacturing and mining industries. It
was in the manufacturing sector that COSATU's membership
started levelling off in the 1990s. On the other hand the
public sector unions in COSATU started growing rapidly in
the 1990s (Macun, 1993:49-50).
The major reasons for the rapid growth of the independent
unions in the 1980s appear to be firstly because of the
changed political climate brought about by the
xlegalisation' of African trade unions by the state.
Secondly, sound workplace organisation in the form of shop
steward structures combined with good local and national
leadership has been identified as a key factor in the
unions' growth. Finally, economic conditions, especially
inflation, acted as a spurt to workers to join unions in
order to protect their real wages (Macun, 1993:51-52).
2.2 Organisational Consequences of Rapid Growth
The rapid growth of unions in the 1980s meant that they grew
large - in some cases extremely large - with their
organisation extending to the national level. Negotiations
became more centralised and the issues being dealt with
commensurately more complex. The structures of the unions
became more complex with Regional and National Executive
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Committees (RECs and NECs) coming on top of Branch Executive
Committees (BECs).
The organisational structure of COSATU also became more
complex. As union densities increased local shop stewards
councils emerged in different localities with shop stewards
from all the unions operating in the localities required to
attend the meetings.
As the unions and COSATU grew in strength they exercised
their political and strategic muscles by forcing their way
onto statutory institutions, such as the National Manpower
Commission and National Training Board. They also took the
initiative in creating forums on which they could influence
economic and industrial policy. The National Economic Forum
was the most significant forum which was only established
after a hard struggle by organised labour.
The implications of all these for trade union democracy was
that the rank and file members as well as their shop
stewards became increasingly remote from the central issues
which the unions were contesting in the 1990s. The issues
being dealt with also became so complex that it was beyond
the capacity of shop stewards to grasp and debate these
issues. As a result agendas of local shop stewards councils
meetings became dominted by issues that came from xhead
office'., The complexity of the issues meant that, far from
generating vibrant debates and giving mandates for national
action, local meetings often turned into long briefing
sessions (Marie, 1992:22). Besides the lack of expertise of
shop stewards, the problem also lay in the COSATU practice
of ^discussing every issue in every structure'. Ironically
the practice had the opposite effect of the intended worker
control. Instead, it created 'the conditions for the
development of a bureaucracy' (Marie, 1992:25).
Consequently, attendance at local meetings also declined. In
1992 approximately 100 out of a possible 500 shop stewards
turned up at COSATU's Durban local whereas in the
Johannesburg local only about 100 of the potential 1000 shop
stewards attended regularly (Keet, 1992:35).
The hierarchical growth of COSATU unions also put strains on
union representatives within the unions. Effective shop
stewards who made it onto their union's NECs were, also on
their RECs and BECs. For a shop steward to be effective xit
is advantageous to attend the whole sequence of meetings
upwards', but for a shop steward to be diligent could
require xattending after-work meetings every night of the
week, and over the weekend' (Keet, .1992:32).
These structural problems within COSATU and its affiliates
implied that worker control could no longer be practiced
effectively in the 1990s. An even more basic problem that
has emerged was the breakdown in communication within the
11
unions, both from the bottom-up as well as from the top- '
down. The implication of this was that the rank and file
members of the unions were no longer aware of what their
leaders' did at national level.
The research conducted in this survey cast light on these
issues. In particular it tested to what extent union
democracy was still in operation at the workplace level.
This is discussed in the next section.
3. Union Democracy at Workplace Level
3.1 Union Membership
Place Fig.l about here
Figure 1 provides a visual presentation of the date when
workers in the survey first joined a trade union. Very few
joined the unions during the height of state repression in
the 1960s. The numbers increased as black unions re-emerged
in the 1970s and struggled for survival. But as Figure 1
demonstrates, the overwhelming majority of respondents in
our survey joined a union for the first time during the
1980s and in 1990. Thereafter the rate of joining tapered
off again in the 1990s. This corresponds with the rapid
growth of black trade unions during the 1980s in the wake of
the 1979 Wiehahn reforms in labour relations which heralded
state recognition of African trade unions for the first time
in the country's history. Most of the respondents had
therefore been members of a trade for between four to
fourteen years with the median falling in 1985. On average
most members in our sample therefore had about nine years
Whereas the membership of the independent unions was only
70 000 at the end of
trade union experience.
A large proportion of the sample was drawn from members of
the ex-FOSATU unions, and other unions that placed an
emphasis on participative shopfloor democracy (the so-called
workerist unions), the most important exceptions being ex-
SAAWU and SAMWU. SAAWU disbanded when COSATU was
established, its membership being divided between umbrella
industrial unions, often centred around former FOSATU
affiliates. Although there have been some recorded
instances of tensions between former FOSATU and SAAWU
members (e.g. the 1990 Mercedes-Benz dispute), this process
of absorbtion was generally successful.
Unfortunately, this survey did not cover many of the most
recently-unionized workers, those in the public sector,
especially in the former homelands. Public sector-workers
enter the union movement with a rather different body of.
previous experience to other categories of worker.
Furthermore, public sector workers are less likely to have
had any direct previous experience of the limits and
possibilities of union organization. It is as yet uncertain
as to what impact these new unionists will have on
established union democratic practices.
Traditionally, the bulk of members in COSATU has been in the
manufacturing and mining sectors. It is also unfortunate
that mineworkers (NUM) is very under-represented in the
sample. Given the history of NUM: it was founded under the
auspices of the Africanist Council of Unions of South Africa
(CUSA) in 1982 and joined COSATU in 1985, it would have been
interesting to observe more closely whether it manifested
any distinct democratic features.
3.2 Formal Shopsteward Structures
Place Fig.2 about here
Almost all respondents (99 %) reported that they had
functional shopsteward structures at their workplace (fig
2). This demonstrates that COSATU has successfully
maintained the tradition of shopfloor organization. It
should be noted that such organization promotes multi-
layered leadership, which is of particular importance at a
time when the upper echelons of the union movement are being
siphoned off into parliament and other state structures. As
was apparent from the state banning of 24 key trade union
activists in November 1976, the sudden removal of key
leadership may severely damage union organization.
Shopfloor organization also forms an important grassroots
counterbalance to industry wide deals.
3.3 Democratic Practices on the Shopfloor
Place Fig.3 about here
Eighty four percent of shopstewards were elected, although
12% were appointed by the union (fig. 3). This demonstrates
a high level of representative democracy being practiced on
the shopfloor in that shop stewards are mostly elected. The
small proportion that are 'appointed by the Unions could
reflect undemocratic practices or early stages of factory
organization when unions often appoint shop stewards
initially to assist in recruitment drives and so on.
Place Fig.4 about here
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Fifty eight percent of respondents had elected their
shopstewards within the preceding twelve months (fig.4).
However, 12% had only done so more than two years
previously, whilst 8% had never done so. Whilst it seems
that a democratic tradition in shopfloor structures has
persisted, there is thus a definite component of COSATU
members (20 %) who have had little recent involvement in
this area of union life.
Statistical tests revealed that there was some relationship
between geographic region and participation in shop steward
elections, with Western Cape workers being the least likely
to have participated. Further analysis revealed that there
was a highly significant (although somewhat weaker)
relationship between union membership and participation in
shopsteward elections. SACTWU members were lease likely to
have participated, followed by SAMWU and SACCAWU.
Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of COSATU workers
regularly participate in this aspect of union affairs.
Place Fig.5 about here
Slightly more than half of shopstewards were elected by
secret ballot, with most of the remainder elected by way of
show of hands (fig. 5). Thus, at least half of COSATU's
membership are familiar with the procedures of voting by
secret ballot, representing a firm basis for democratic
participation both politically and in the workplace.
3.4 Mandates and Accountability
Place Fig.6 about here
When electing shopstewards, ninety nine percent of
respondents believed that they had given shop stewards a one
or other mandate to carry out directions from the shopfloor,
rather than a completely open-ended brief. Two thirds felt
that the mandate entailed consultation with workers every
time decisions were made that may affect them (fig. 6).
However, one third felt that this was only necessary as far
as important issues are concerned. In other words, the
overwhelming majority saw that shopstewards were issued with
rather narrowly-defined mandates.
Place Fig.7 about here
Again, most COSATU workers believed in strictly-defined
notions of accountability. Seventy-seven percent believed
that shopstewards are expected to report back to workers
every time they acted on workers' behalf. Should they not
do so, almost all who responded to this question said that
workers should have the right to dismiss shopstewards (fig.
7). However, many respondents chose not to respond to this
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question. Even so, almost one third of respondents had
experience of shopstewards being dismissed at their current
place of employment. The reasons for the dismissals are not ^.,
known, but whatever they are, the results demonstrate that "' "V
workers do apply their power to dismiss shopfloor
representatives they do not deem to be acting in their
interest.
3.5 Attendance at Union Meetings
Seventy-six percent of respondents claimed to have attended
at least one union_meeting within the last month. On the
other hand almost one tenth had never attended union
meetings. Thus, there is evidence that a segment of union
membership is not formally involved in union affairs.
Perhaps, as Pateman (1970:83) suggests, there may be a
linkage between the types of decisions made and the degree
of participation. It seems evident that there will be a
greater willingness to participate in decision making,
should the issues covered be of more immediate concern. In
other words, the amount of democratic participation may be .
affected by whether the union has its primary focus on day-
to-day shopfloor issues, or on national level policy
concerns. It is through such visible democracy that active
participation can be ensured over the long term.
It was in the Western Cape region that workers were least
likely to attend union meetings. Meeting attendance was
lowest amongst SACCAWU, CAWU, and CWIU members. Against
this must be considered the large deviation in responses
amongst CWIU members, with 52% attending meetings on a
weekly basis. Even among SACCAWU and CAWU members a
si2eable grouping went to union meeting regularly.
Thus, there seems to be a high level of participation in
union affairs amongst almost all COSATU affiliates, again
indicating that the internal democracy characteristic of
many of the early independent unions has successfully been
preserved.
3.6 Participation and Democracy
Place Table 1 about here
Table l compares participation in union meetings with the
method of acquiring shopstewards, that is, whether the shop
» <r- stewards were elected by members or appointed by the union.
This is of particular importance in that it reflects the
relationship between participation and democracy within the
union movement. There is a statistically significant
i o r h i between the two: in those workplaces where
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there is a high level of attendance, there are also likely
to be democratically-elected shopstewards. In other words,
high levels of participation also result in high levels of
union democracy.
It is possible that the relationship between the two
variables may be a two-way one. Workers would be more
motivated to participate in union structures should
democratic practices be the norm, and when it is possible
for them to have a real impact on union structures.
Similarly, high levels of attendance at union meetings would
make it easier to call shopstewards to account and greatly
facilitate the holding of regular elections.
Most workers surveyed reported high levels of shopfloor
democracy. The unions seem indeed fortunate in being in a
high participation-high democracy cycle. New recruits
socialised into such an environment would ultimately
contribute to its reinforcement. However, the democracy-
participation cycle is vulnerable to external pressures,
such as the need for engagement in wider socio-political
issues.
3.7 Skill versus Participation in Trade Union Activities
Place Table 2 about here
Table 2 compares skill level with attendance at union
meetings. This relationship was statistically significant.
Thus, it is not only the case that the unions have a
component of workers who possess some degree of skill, but
it is precisely these workers who are most likely to
participate in union affairs.
This finding would seem to reinforce the argument that the
unions represent a particular, highly privileged, segment of
the labour market, namely those who possess a degree of
skill. There is little doubt that union members can be seen
to constitute an xinsider' segment of the labour market in
comparison to the unemployed, rural poor, and informally
employed 'outsiders'. However, there is considerable,
evidence to support the supposition that skill does not
represent the most significant division, and that unions
have generally been successful in representing the interests
of all their members. It has been the most active and
effective COSATU affiliates that have succeeded in
compressing the wage-skill differential (Wood 1994:156). In
other words, the unions remain rather broad bodies, seeking
to maximise the benefits of all their members, regardless of
skill level.
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3.8 Union Democracy and Length of Union Membership
Is internal democracy an historical anomaly, associated with
recent unionization? A Kruskal-Wallace analysis, of
attendance at union meetings by the length of time
individuals had been members of the union movement, revealed
that there was no pattern or linkage between the two.
However, there was a relationship between workers'
attendance at union meetings and length of time they had
been members of their current union. It does seem to be the
case that workers who joined their current union in the late
1980s or early 1990s are more likely to participate in union
affairs. Nonetheless, most long-standing union members
still took part in union affairs on a regular basis. Thus,
whilst high levels of participation in union affairs is not
confined to those who have most recently joined the union
movement, it is apparent that those who have been members of
the same union for a relatively long period of time are
somewhat less likely to attend union meetings.
3.9 Diversity and Democracy: Tendency towards a Democratic
Culture
The formation of COSATU represented the bringing together of
a number of diverse traditions of unionism. The process of
union unity indeed represent a number of coalitions, between
those with differing approaches to union organization,
between different categories of workers, and between
political and workplace activists. Firstly, as noted above,
it seems that certain unions are marked by lower levels of
democratic participation than others. Nonetheless, a
general tendency seems to have been towards a common
democratic culture. In other words, in view of the high
levels of democratic participation encountered in almost all
unions, it seems that it was the participative tradition
gained dominance during the unification and consolidation of
the union movement. This lends confirmation to Erwin's
perception that a democratic ethic had been established in
the FOSATU unions and the expectation existed amongst
workers that the unions ought to be democratic. As Pateman
(1990:104) notes, 'we learn to participate by
participating'. In other words, participation in democratic
structures is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. Those
socialised in a participative environment are indeed more
likely to actively participate in the future (ibid.:105).
This can largely explain the endurance of union shopfloor
democracy in many cases two decades after its inception.
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3.10 The Challenges facing Union Democracy
As Arendt (1965:218) notes, an initial wave of grassroots
collective action, although founded on democratic practices,
will not always ensure lasting accountability and
representivity. Organizations dedicated to change tend to
have high levels of democratic commitment and practice at
their inception. Fairly soon, however, this becomes
subsumed by the desire to ensure organizational stability
and continuity (Arendt 1965:219). This desire can inhibit
both internal democracy and the capacity to effectively
engage in collective action in the future.
This represents one of the major dilemmas facing the
independent unions today. Unlike earlier attempts at mass
unionization, the independent unions succeeded in
consolidating early gains and survived periodic bouts of
state repression. They also have moved beyond a reliance on
a few key activists. However, this could have had some
impact on the earlier organizational vitality. Although, as
noted above, the early shopfloor democracy has persisted,
questions emerge as to the relationship between union
leaders and their constituency and the possibility of
bureaucratization. Many workers have had experience of
having dismissed shopstewards who failed to carry out their
wishes, but it is unclear how far this direct accountability
has extended up union structures. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, shopfloor democracy has survived a gradual process
of institutionalization.
3.11 Democratic Rupture in Unions at National Level
Although shopfloor democracy was still intact in COSATU in
1994 the same could not be said about worker participation
in trade union involvement at national level. The survey
found consistently that workers bore very little knowledge
about major national affairs their unions were involved in
and that they also did not participate in such affairs. This
applied to the unions' involvement in the National Manpower
Commisssion (NMC), the National Economic Forum (NEF), and
the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).
On average 74% of the workers interviewed did not know what
the NMC, the NEC, or the RDP was. The results showed very
little variance. The lowest percentage was 71% for the RDP
and the highest was 76% for the NEF. Furthermore, the level
of participation in the activities of the NMC or NEF was
negligibly small: only 12% of the workers claimed to have
been at a report-back meeting on the NMC while only 15%
could recall being at a union meeting where the NEF was
being discussed. Similarly only 15% of the interviewees had
participated in any way in the formulation of the RDP.
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4. Understanding of Parliamentary Democracy
Workers transferred their understanding of trade union
shopfloor democracy directly to their expectations of
parliamentary democracy/They expected their political party
to display the same degree of representativeness and
accountability as practised by their shop stewards on the
shopfloor. No less than 68% of respondents (440 out of 643)
were of the view that their political party had to consult
with its supporters on all issues, and when the party makes
decisions in parliament that affects it supporters it must
report back every time. About 29% were of the opinion that
the party had to consult with and report back to its
supporters only on important issues affecting them while a
negligibly small 3% regarded it as unnecessary for the party
to consult or report back because it had been elected to
represent their interest.
COSATU workers were therefore clear that they did not regard
the act of voting as an open mandate for the party they
support. About two-thirds of respondents expected the party
to receive a mandate from its supporters on every issue and
to report back to them on every issue; clearly an unworkable
expectation. Respondents went even further and a majority
(59%) felt that they should be able to recall their party if
it did not do what its supporters wanted. This result has to
be treated with caution though as 235 (37%) of the workers
interviewed did not respond to the question, indicating an
uncertainty either with what was meant by the question or
with how to answer it.
4.1 Material Expectations from New Government
In spite of the fact that most of the workers interviewed
did not know what the Reconstruction and Development Program
(RDP) is, they expressed high expectations that it would
deliver benefits in virtually all areas of social need
identified by the RDP. What is of particular interest to
this paper is what the workers said they would do if the new
government fails to deliver the benefits. The thrust of
their answer was that they would put pressure on the
government through some or other form of action rather than
bringing about change through the ballot box. Analysing the
results more closely the strongest support (72%) was for
participating in on-going mass action to force the
government to deliver on its promises. Strong support was
also expressed for two other forms of pressure: taking
collective action by the unions, and putting pressure on
former unionists that were sent to parliament. Both options
received support from 65% of the respondents. Voting for
another party in the next election was supported by 40% of
the respondents (with 26% giving no response), while 30%
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response), while 30% backed the formation of an alternative
party that would provide the benefits (31% gave no response
to this option).
4.2 Political Expectations from the New Government
The workers surveyed did not however think that the new
government would act unilaterally in matters affecting
workers. No less than 75% were of the opinion that it would
not be possible for the new government to make policies
affecting unions without consulting the unions.
There was, however, a scepticism on the part of the workers
about the extent to which political parties and parliament
could be relied upon to look after worker interests. Whereas
94% of the workers interviewed were of the opinion that
workers would always need trade unions to protect their
interests, they were uncertain whether political parties
would in fact do so. A majority (51%) were of the opinion
that workers could not rely on political parties to protect
their interests; 37% thought they could always rely on
political parties, while 12% did not know. There was however
less scepticism about parliament itself: 60% regarded it as
the best forum for workers to pursue their own interests,
25% disagreed, while the remaining 15% did not know.
Workers interviewed were however of the opinion that it was
possible to make political parties look after worker
interests. They also strongly agreed on, the best way of
doing so: an overwhelming majority (79%) agreed with the
statement that Nthe best way to ensure that political
parties look after worker interests is to have many former
trade unionists as members of that party'.
Implications and conclusion
A key issue to emerge from the survey is a concern on the
part of COSATU workers about how they are going to ensure
the representativeness and accountability of the
parliamentarians they have voted into power; that is, how
they are going to ensure that the government of national
unity is going to act in the interests of the working class.
The new government does have some leeway in that workers do
not expect it to act exclusively in the interests of the
working class. In the survey only 4% of the COSATU workers
thought that a political party which drew the majority of
its supporters from workers had to.represent only the
interests of workers, while 39% thought that it had to
represent the interests of all its supporters, including
those who were not workers. In a remarkable display of
altruism, a further 20% of respondents thought a worker
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party had to represent the interests of all South Africans,
even if worker interests had to be sacrificed.
But even so, it is clear from the survey that OCSATU workers
have real economic and political expectations from the new
government. They will thus expect it to deliver and hold the
ANC responsible for such delivery.
However, the ANC and government of national unity are going
to be subject to many pressures from outside the ranks of
the working class. Firstly, because the ANC is itself a
multi-class party, secondly, because of the demands from
other social classes that their needs be met, and thirdly,
because of the conditions that have to be met to ensure
sustained economic growth. Of the demands from other social
classes three clear groups can be identified, the petty
bourgeoisie in the form of small and micro business
entrepeneurs, the domestic bourgeoisie, namely the corporate
and financial gaints of South Africa, and the international
bourgeoisie in charge of global corporations and financial
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank.
The small business men and women will put pressure on the
government to create favourable conditions to ensure the
profitability of their enterprises by having little or no
regulation. This could constitute a threat to the labour
standards COSATU would wish to maintain. Both domestic and
international capital will put pressure on the government to
create the necessary climate and conditions for investment
to take place in South Africa. This will include not only an
absence of violence, but greater stability in the workplace.
To achieve this the strike level will have to be reduced.
Finally, the requirements of sustainable economic growth
will place the need for strict budgetary restraint on the
government which, in turn, will place a limit on the state's
capacity to spend money on reconstruction and development.
Given these social forces it is not unreasonable to expect
that the new government will at times act in ways that
COSATU would deem to consider to be against its members
interests.
The confidence that COSATU members have in former trade
unionists in parliament to represent their interests is very
unlikely to materialise. This is because of the form
parliamentary democracy has assumed under the new
constitution. The requirement of power-sharing has meant
that key decisions have been taken in the cabinet rather
than in the ANC parliamentary caucus. (9) But even if
parliamentary decision-making were to be democratised,
severe restraints would still be placed on individual ANC
members of parliament. They will be bound by majority
9. Weekly Mail, %Ramaphosa flexes his caucus muscles,'
June 24-30, 1994, p.4.
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decisions in the caucus with very little room left for
dissent. The ability of former COSATU members, for instance,
to resign from the party and remain in parliament as COSATU
representatives does not exist as the constitution requires
them to vacate their seats forthwith (section 43(b)). In
addition, the method of parliamentary representation through
lists rather than constituencies, means that individual
parliamentarians are not accountable to constituencies. Even
if the ANC were to implement its plan to give all its
members of parliament constituencies to take care of, the
reality at the end of the day is that those constituencies
do not have the power to dismiss ltheir' members of
parliament.
The only recourse of effective action left to COSATU should
the new government of national unity act against the workers
interests would thus be collective action. To be effective,
it would have to take place at the national level. What its
effects would be for the COSATU-ANC alliance is hard to
predict. What is clear though, is that COSATU workers are
going to have to adapt their understanding of parliamentary
democracy over the next five years if they wish to ensure
that worker interests are adequately represented in the new.
parliament.
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Endnotes
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Figure 2: Do you have shopstewards in your workplace?
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